Bellofiore–Crisis Theory and the Great Recession.

reificationofpersonsandpersonificationofthings

View original post

An Introduction to the Three Volumes of Karl Marx’s Capital – Review

An Introduction to the Three Volumes of Karl Marx’s Capital – Review

A great review of Michael Heinrich’s Introduction to Capital courtesy of the Marx and Philosophy website.

To What extent can the Franco Regime (1939 – 1975) be characterised as a Fascist State? Conclusion – A Fascist State?

The main concern of this dissertation was to define the idea regarding whether the Franco regime could effectively be described as fascist. This has involved first coming to an understanding of what a fascist state is then providing a descriptive account of fascism in Spain, and a chapter dealing with the characteristics of the Franco regime. The criteria used for defining a fascist state were related to ideology, economic and societal relations with a specific focus on class. The reasons for this were that I believe this to be the most important factors in defining a state as fascist.
Francoism as an ideology shares some of the tenets of fascism most notably ideas around nationalism, empire and social hierarchy. That said, these points are very problematic, the reaction that characterised the Franco regime was one against republicanism, secularism and modernity. Within it lay a strong belief in tradition that was heavily linked to Spanish history and an understanding of how Spain ought to be governed. The nature of fascism in Italy and Germany had far more of a modernist aura to it most notably around industry and technology not to mention espousing anti-clericalism and its own brand of secularism. This process was in cases very complex as both states sent out mixed messages regarding such issues, for instance Nazi Germany was heavily committed to heavy industry yet it also proposed a traditional idea of man and nature in harmony specifically in culture such as art. As was noted in chapter 1 this was linked to a wilful capitalisation on issues that could benefit the party for political gain, its ideology was varied as a process of such opportune tactics yet it retained several consistent themes. This is an ideological characteristic of all fascist states. Francoism as such did not go through such a process and the civil war can be seen as the factor that helped to bring a sharp focus to Spanish Nationalism, and compelled Franco to build his regime around a coalition of traditional and conservative forces as a matter of military necessity, which was discussed in chapter 2. The civil war unified those forces on the right and gave them a political ideology that converged around ideas such as tradition, religion and nationalism. The end of the civil war merely meant the process by which these ideas should be implemented. There was little need to appeal to other groups as the nationalists had a total victory that was cemented by a harsh period of repression. The forces that made up the Franco regime knew quite clearly what they opposed and what they were fighting for. Unlike fascism there was a less varied and clearer vision for society that was intrinsically linked to a traditional idea of Spain. The ability to capitalise on social grievances was not a factor for Francosim, it cared little for those sections of society that were not its own, it did not need to appease nor win them over as it had won the civil war. The class polarisation of Spanish society was no doubt a factor in this; the civil war was originally planned as a military coup not a revolution as such. In this sense the nationalist’s plans were to assume control of the state for the greater good and to preserve their hegemony over the state against the attacks of the Second Republic. The ‘New Spain’ was in fact nonsense, the aim was a preservation of the status quo and a renewed identity of Spain with its past. As such Francoism cannot be viewed as an ideology compatible with those of fascist states; it has useful points of similarity but has too many differences regarding tradition and its static nature which mainly result from it being founded through a civil war unlike the fascist states.
The question of economic structure is in many ways linked to ideology as the aim in the early years was a process of maintaining the status of control of those forces that had been victorious during the civil war. The landowners and financiers regained control and the economic structure was developed in line with the needs of the victors. The issue of comparison becomes difficult when one compares the relative state of both economies and their prime industries. Spain both pre and post civil war was a heavily agrarian based economy with very small industrial sectors while Germany and Italy had larger industrial sectors (Both did still had agrarian based sectors). This point is useful but whether agrarian or industrial both Franco Spain and the fascist states did not seek to eradicate capitalist relations. The Franco regime was by no means your typical capitalist state; it was heavily state interventionist and attempted a programme of self sufficiency and self competition which proved disastrous. The isolationism of the Franco regime was in large due to external factors rather than internal and in this sense it would be difficult to qualify whether it would have opened up to international trade had it not been isolated. Certainly fascist states were never opposed to trade agreements but they also operated on a strong state interventionist model and pursued programs of self sufficiency. The question of class structure is important as there would be a clear difference in relation to class structures as fascist states had a larger urban working class as opposed to peasants and agricultural labourers operating in Spain. As chapter 3 noted it was the introduction of industry that brought about the growth of class peace within Spain that post Franco helped bring about a liberal democracy. The differences here are again largely unimportant as they merely show that Spain was not at a similar level of industrial development as Italy and Germany yet it remained on the whole a form of capitalism. There was also a high level of workforce discipline yet a complete naivety regarding economic strategy. This lay in the contradiction of wanting to preserve traditional societal relations while striving for economic growth. In short economic relations were of greater similarity to fascist states than that of ideology. Capitalism was maintained with similar state orientation to the economy and while there are notable differences in the stages of industrial and class development the relations were the same.
It would appear on the economic question then that the Franco regime was a fascist state yet one could note that this would qualify practically all authoritarian dictatorships as fascist in their economic approach. This is in itself inadequate; there are numerous examples of states resorting to similar economic models to that of fascism in times of crisis. What differentiates fascist states is the political process by which it comes to power; it is not merely a response to economic and political crisis but the way in which this is manifested. What I refer to here is the process that brought both Mussolini and Hitler to power was one that was marked by similarities relating to mass movements, popular mobilisations, a mass party, and the organisations of private paramilitary and private police formations under the direct control of the party and its leadership. This approach is one that marks fascist states as different from regimes such as Franco’s, yes it was borne out of political crisis, but this was manifested through a process that was markedly different from fascism. The Franco regime was borne out of a civil war; it started as a military coup by a group of elite Generals, not as a process of mass movements and popular mobilisations led by a radical nationalist party. It was Franco’s employment of authoritarian political arrangements that made it easy to see the regime as fascist, yet this ignored the reality of how such things come into being. The regime did not operate on the basis of those attributes associated with fascism; it merely sought to adopt them as a matter of political convenience and exigency. Consequently, this dissertation rejects the notion that Franco’s regime was fascist. Neither the means by which it came to power, nor the manner in which is consolidated or sustained it domination of Spanish society, can be characterised as fascist.

 

Endnotes

 
i Ortega y Gasset – A Spanish liberal philosopher most associated with perspectivism. Wrote for the Newspaper El Sol and taught and lectured at several Universities during his career. Regarded as the leading intellect during 1920’s and 30’s and as such his opinion was revered. Fled Spain at outbreak of civil war but returned in late 1940’s to take up post in Madrid at the Institute of Humanities. Alot of material on Gasset is in Spanish but most books dealing with Primo dictatorship and civil war deal with Gasset and his influence. See Payne 1999.
ii Government 1917-1923 – There had been several governments during this period all of whom had failed to remedy Spain’s economic and political problems. Most notable during this period were the military defeats in Morocco and the conflicts with the Anarchist CNT in Barcelona. In both cases the government had become extremely unpopular both with the working and middle classes. See Brenan 1943/1978. iii UGT – Unión General de Trabajadores (General Union of Workers). Historically affiliated with the PSOE (Spanish Socialist Party) and seen by many as the Socialist trade union as compared with the Anarchist CNT. A varied and somewhat complex history due to conflicts regarding its radical and reformist wings. A major faction during the Second Republic and civil war and banished during Franco regime. It emerged after regime and remains active to this day. Detailed in most books dealing with civil war. See Broue/Temime 1970 and Brenan 1943/1978.
iv Haroun al Rashid – A Arab Abbasid Caliph in Iraq during 9th century. Rashid’s rule was marked by a scientific, religious and cultural prosperity. He was also a very capable politician and military tactician. In using the comparison Brenan must be alluding to the similarities in relation to prosperity and the military victory in Morocco. See Clot 1989.
v Edmondo Rossoni – One of the leaders of national syndicalism in Italy prior to First World War and who the joined fascists in 1921 eventually becoming undersecretary to the Fascist Grand Council. Imprisoned after World War Two. Seen by many as an important intellect with particular reference to the merging of syndicalism with fascism. See Sternhell 1994 for more on fascism and syndicalism. See Tinghino 1990 for account of Rossoni’s life. vi SA – Sturmabteilung (Storm troopers). The SA was the first paramilitary group of the Nazi Party and was its armed wing during the 1920’s and 1930’s. Referred to also as ‘Brownshirts’ due to the uniform they wore they were compared with Mussolini’s Blackshirts. Originally one of the major factions within the Nazi party the SA lost influence after the ascension of power by Hitler in 1933. This was down to several factors including personal rivalries but also political views, the SA were seen as to radical by other groups within the party particularly their perceived socialist views. In 1934 their leaders were either arrested or executed in what is known as the ‘Night of the Long knives’. A mass of material is available on the SA. See Sternhell 1994 for work on Syndicalism and see Fisher 2002 for rise of Nazi’s.
vii CEDA – Confederacion Espanola de Derechas Autonomas (Spanish Confederation of the Autonomous Right) A political alliance of right wing catholic parties brought together under Gil Robles. It won power in 1933 but disintegrated after losing 1936 election with most of its members joining the Falange. See Beevor 1982/2007.
viii Carlists – Communion Tradicionalista (Traditional Communion) Supporters of the rival Bourbon line of Don Carlos as opposed to Alfonsine line. Fiercely ultra-catholic and historically opposed to liberalism. See Beevor 1982/2007 also for history see Brenan 1943/1978.
ix General Mola – (Emilio) Along with Jose Sanjuro the leading army officer involved in uprising and one of the main conspirators. After Sanjuro’s death Mola became commander of Army of the North with Franco
commander of the Army of the South. Died in June 1937 in airplane crash. Was posthumously given title Duke after death which his son inherited. See Beevor 1982/2007 and Payne 1999.
x Franco ascension – Franco became military chief on 21st September after military chiefs voted him Commander-in-Chief over Mola and a Junta. This confirmed above all Franco’s supremacy and there would be very few challenges to this from this point on. See Payne 1999 and Beevor 1982/2007.
xi Calvo Sotelo – A leading Conservative politician during Second Republic and previously a minister under Primo. Was a Deputy for Renovacion Espanola (RE) a pro monarchist party and leader of the opposition against the Popular Front. Was assassinated by Socialist Party members on July 13th 1936 and this is widely believed to have convinced the plotting Generals to go through with the uprising. It also convinced Franco to support it. See Preston 1994.
44
xii Junta Politica – What would become Franco’s political council and was used during the war as a way of bringing together the nationalist forces and maintaining Franco’s supremacy. See Payne 1999.
xiii Fate of Hedilla and Fal Conde – Following Franco’s rise Hedilla was arrested and sentenced to death for treason. Sentenced was reduced to life imprisonment and Hedilla was eventually pardoned in 1946 and released. Eventually established himself as a private businessman and did quite well for himself. Died in 1970.
Manuel Fal Conde leader of the Carlists like Hedilla refused to take part in the FET mainly as an opponent of political parties preferring the idea of movements. He wanted as did all Carlists a restored Bourbon Monarchy which Franco would never countenance. Franco gave Fal Conde a choice of either court martial or exile; he chose the latter and moved to Portugal where he died in 1975. See Payne 1999 for both figures.
xiv Appeasement – The term generally used to denote the period during which successive states (particularly the UK and France) tried to avoid conflict with Nazi Germany. Blocs of influence arose and the period became more and tenser with Hitler continually breaking the Versailles Treaty. It culminated with Hitler’s invasion of Poland and the UK and France declaring war. Numerous books deal with this topic. See Bolloten 1991 for a good understanding of geo-politics at the time.
xv Fascist state – It is worth noting here that the denoting of the Franco regime as fascist had alot to do with the Comintern directives for what could be labelled fascist during the period. This had been extremely varied at one point Social Democrat parties were given the title ‘Social Fascists’. Most parties of the right could be referred to as fascist. It is understandable in such a climate to see why the Nationalists and later the Franco regime would be labelled fascist. See Broue/Temime 1970 and Bolloten 1991.
xvi Caudillo – Franco was referred to as Caudillio de Espana porla Gracia de Dios (Great leader of Spain by the grace of God). Franco is referred to by this title in several books along with Generalissimo. The term tends to denote a military leader though it has several different interpretations. See: Payne 1987.
iiFreemasonry – Franco was obsessed by what he perceived as the conspiratorial nature of freemasonry and passed a law prohibiting it. Most broad biographies of Franco deal with this along with works on the regime and civil war. See: Carr/Fusi 1979/1983.
xviii Moors and reunification – The victory over the Moors was a major episode in Spanish history. It is seen by many as the birth of Spain and also the beginning of its Golden Age. An interesting fact to note is that the victory set into place the territorial differences within Spain that were to last. The power of Castile and the only region not to be conquered being in the North including the Basque country. These factors have been of great importance to Spain ever since the Moors were defeated. There are several books on the victory over the Moors and also many dealing with the regional differences within Spain. See Brenan 1943/1978 for geo- political differences within Spain and Payne 1999 gives a good understanding to the nationalist idea that resonated in relation to empire and unification.
xix Opus dei – Word of God. A very interesting group within the Franco regime that show more than any other both the contradictions of the regime and its evolution. It is still in existence to this day. Most of the work dealing with them is in Spanish though a few English books give good details about them. See: Payne 1987
xx 1898 – The loss of its final colonies in the Caribbean to the U.S. was seen by many as an insult given the relative youth of the victors. It had a strong effect on many people within Spain most notably a group of writers called the ‘Generation of ‘98’. They emerged in this period and wrote a great deal about the question of Spanish identity among other things. All books that detail the background of both the civil war and regime should bare mention of the significance of 1898. See: Brenan 1943/1978.
xxi Autarky – Literally means self-sufficient and this is thus applied to political and economic systems that attempt this. Can be traced back to certain elements of mercantilism in respect of trading within empire. Is generally seen as a policy sought by fascist states specifically Nazi Germany though to what degree it was implemented is debatable. Other examples can include states such as Stalinist dictatorships like Albania and presently North Korea. See Payne 1987 for good information on Spain’s claim to be an Autarky.
xxii Agrarian question – The question of agrarian reform was a permanent fixture in Spain for nearly two centuries and it remained unresolved and was a major factor in the causation of the Spanish civil war. In many ways it personified the regime and its traditionalism with how it conducted agrarian affairs up until the late 1950’s. See Brenan 1943/1978.
xxiii Globalisation – denotes the now global character of economic relations and other issues such as culture. Dates regarding when it appeared vary from the ending of Second World War to the ending of the cold war. Other critics see it as a mere continuation of capitalist development while others see it as a significant break with previous relations between states. Numerous books available on the topic and broader international relations. See: Bayliss/Owens/Smith (eds) 2008.
45
xxiv Italian and German self sufficiency – The goals of self-sufficiency within the two states were related to its goals of attaining an Autarkic economy and weakening others. However both states traded with each other and Germany imported alot of raw material for rearmament. See Kershaw 1985/1993 for details of German economy and see Blinkhorn 1984/1994 for Italy.

 

Bibliography

 
Arendt, H. (1951/1973) The Origins of Totalitarianism (London, Trinity Press).
Beevor, A. (1982/2000) The Battle for Spain (London, Phoenix Press).
Blinkhorn, M. (1984/1994) Mussolini and Fascist Italy (London, Routledge).
Blinkhorn, M. (1990) Fascists and Conservatives: the radical right and the establishment in twentieth-century Europe (London, Unwyn Hyman).
Bolloten, B. (1991) The Spanish Civil War; Revolution and Counterrevolution (Hemel Hempstead, Harvester Wheatseaf).
Borkenau, F. (1938/2000) The Spanish Cockpit (London, Phoenix Press).
Brenan, G. (1943/1978) The Spanish Labyrinth (London, Cambridge University Press).
Broue, P. / Temime, E. (1970) The Revolution and Civil War in Spain (London, Faber and Faber).
Broszat, M. (1981) The Hitler State: The foundation and development of the internal structure of the Third Reich (New York, Longman Inc).
Carr, R. (1980) Modern Spain 1875-1980 (Oxford, Oxford University Press)
Carr, R. / Fusi, J.P. (1979/1983) Spain: dictatorship to democracy (London, Allen and Unwin).
Clot, A. (1989) Haroun al-Rashid and the world of the Thousand and one nights (London, Saqi publishers).
Davies, P. /Lynch, D. (2002) The Routledge Companion to Fascism and the Far-Right (London, Routledge).
Fischer, C. (2002) The rise of the Nazis 2nd edition (Manchester, Manchester University Press).
Friedrich, C.J./Brzezinski, Z. (1965) Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy 2nd edition (New York, Praeger).
Gilmour, D. (1985) the transformation of Spain: from Franco to the Constitutional Monarchy (London, Quartet Books Limited).
Grugel, J. /Rees, T. (1997) Franco’s Spain (London, Arnold Publishers).
47
Kershaw, I. (1985/1993) The Nazi Dictatorship; 3rd edition (London, Hodder and Staughton).
Kitchen, M. (1976/1994) Fascism (London, Macmillan).
Orwell, G. (1938/1989) Homage to Catalonia (London, Penguin Books).
Payne, S.G. (1999) Fascism in Spain 1923-1977 (Wisconsin, University of Wisconsin Press).
Payne, S.G. (1987) The Franco Regime 1936-1975 (Wisconsin, University of Wisconsin Press).
Poulantzas, N. (1970/1974) Fascism and Dictatorship: the Third International and the problem of Fascism (London, New Left Books).
Poulantzas, N. (1976) The Crisis of the Dictatorships: Portugal, Greece and Spain (London, New Left Books).
Preston, P. (1994) Franco: a biography (London, Harper Collins).
Romero, F.J.S. (1999) Twentieth-century Spain: politics and society in Spain 1898-1998 (New York, Macmillan).
Schapiro, L. (1972) Totalitarianism (London, Macmillan).
Sternhell, Z. (1994) The birth of Fascist Ideology: From cultural rebellion to political revolution (Chichester, Princeton University Press).
Thomas, H. (1968/1970) The Spanish Civil War 2nd edition (London, Hamilton).
Tingho, J.J. (1990) Edmondo Rossoni: From Revolutionary Syndicalism to Fascism (New York, Peter Lang).

 

Essays within readers and edited books

 
Ben-Ami, S. (1983) Fascism from above: The dictatorship of Primo de Rivera in Spain, 1923-1930, in Kallis, A. (Editor) (2003) The Fascism Reader (London, Routledge) pp475-482.
Dunne,

T. (2008) ‘Liberalism’, in Baylis, J., Smith, S, and Owens, P. (eds), ‘The Globalisation of World Politic, 4th Edition’ (Oxford, Oxford University Press) pp110-120.
Ellwood, S.M. (1986) Falange Espanola 1933-1939: from Fascism to Francoism, in Kallis, A, (Editor) (2003) The Fascism Reader (London, Routledge) pp223-232.
48
Esteban, J. (1976) The economic policy of Francoism: an interpretation, in Preston, P. (Editor) (1976) Spain in Crisis: the evolution and decline of the Franco Regime (Sussex, Harvester Press) pp.82-101.
Mackenzie, A. (eds) The Republic Besieged: Civil War in Spain 1936 – 1939 (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press) pp 1-22.
Moradiella, E. (1996) The Gentle General: The official British perception of General Franco during the Spanish Civil War, in Preston, P. And Mackenzie, A. (eds) The Republic Besieged Civil War in Spain 1936 – 1939 (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press) pp23-48.
Paxton, R.O. (1998) The Five stages of Fascism, in Kallis, A. (Editor) (2003) The Fascism Reader (London, Routledge) pp 89-101.
Preston, P. (1996) Mussolini’s Spanish Adventure: From Limited Risk to War, in Preston, P. And Mackenzie, A. (eds) The Republic Besieged: Civil War in Spain 1936 – 1939 (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press).
Southworth, H.R. (1976) The Falange: an analysis of Spain’s Fascist heritage, in Preston, P. (Editor) (1976) Spain in Crisis: the evolution and decline of the Franco Regime (Sussex, Harvester Press) pp.1-23.

To what extent can the Franco Regime (1939 – 1975) be characterised a fascist state? Chapter Three – The Franco Regime

The Franco Regime
3.1 Introduction
This chapter’s aim will be to analyse and examine the Franco regime. To do this will involve looking at certain characteristics that will be vital to defining it as a fascist state in the conclusive chapter. Chapter 1 laid out the necessary criteria regarding what constitutes a fascist state. As such, this chapter will follow this line and concentrate on the ideological framing of the Franco regime while analysing economic and societal relations.
3.2 Ideology – Francoism

 

Generalisimo Franco in his fully military attire, images such as this became a feature of his rule

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The main tenets of Francoism can be best seen through the main array of groups which made up the victorious nationalist forces in 1939; the military, church and the FET. (Carr/Fusi, 1979/1983, p.21). As such the ideology of Francoism can be viewed as a mixture of these elements and their continual search for power. Franco was Head of State and chose his Ministers depending on their performance; the main ambition for those wanting Ministerial roles was to please the Caudillo (Grugel/Rees, 1997, p.24). This helped create a somewhat mixed ideological message yet there are features which can be seen as distinct. One of these will be dealt with in this chapter, that of tradition. This is due to my understanding that tradition was the most vital aspect of Francoism as a state ideology.

In the immediate aftermath of the civil war a harsh and brutal period of repression took place were tens of thousands of ‘enemies’ of the regime were imprisoned and executed (Grugel/Rees, 1997, p.23). The policy here was one that Franco had sought from the beginning of the rebellion; total victory. This did not just mean winning the war it meant the destruction of those elements and groups that had brought Spain to near destruction (Grugel/Rees, 1997, p.23). Any lingering sympathy with the Second Republic had to be defeated and a new order to be established (Grugel/Rees, 1997, p.23). This fitted aptly with the image of the nationalist cause as a ‘Crusade’ against those treasonous sections of Spanish society (Grugel/Rees, 1997, p.24). This notion and idea of a crusade is important and was in many ways to become the symbol of the Franco regime. Franco had rescued the Spanish people from the curse of communism and Freemasonry and was effectively absolving her sins. This Christian imagery and mysticism of Francoism was more than mere propaganda. Putting aside Franco’s own Roman Catholicism, his forces had, in large part, been made up of people opposed to the religious reforms implemented by the Second Republic (Brenan, 1943/1978, p.231). It was in the regions of Spain where the Roman Catholic Church was most powerful that Franco found his strongest support; Navarre and Leon being just two (Brenan, 1943/1978, p.320). This perceived attack on the traditional values of the church not only played a significant part during the war it was with the solidly hierarchical and ultramontane values of traditional Spanish Catholicism that Franco identified the new Spain. It wasn’t merely a case of support from one section of society; it was far deeper than that, Catholicism was a major factor in Spain as important as any other ideology or political party of the period. Its significance went all the way back to the defeat of the Moors, the expulsion of the Jews, and the unification of ‘Catholic Spain’ by their ‘Catholic Majesties, Isabella and Ferdinand’. It therefore seemed inevitable to base Francoism and project its image as one with a strong religious theme. This wasn’t necessarily an intentional step but one that was borne out of the reality of the situation, not only were Franco and the majority of his supporters Catholics but the church in Spain exerted great influence among the population at large; there was no other institution capable of underpinning the legitimacy of the Franco regime with such assurance. However, Franco was always careful never to allow the church too much power in order to maintain the primacy of his own rule, and avoid offending the other non-clerical members of his regime. That said, even in the post war period acceptance of the church and its morals was high, even among hard line members of the FET who at various times espoused anti-clericalism (Gilmour, 1985, p.11). Obviously the forging of Francoism owed a great deal to the loss of so many opponents of the church, whether dead, imprisoned or pacified; opposition to the church’s values at the time was near impossible. With this it is clear to see that through the church that Francoism adapted a strong line of religious traditionalism. This was steeped in Catholicism and perceived itself as a defensive reaction against Republican secular modernity, and was full of religious symbolism and mysticism.
The importance of the church was key throughout the evolution of the regime; it maintained its position whereas others like the FET did not. The church itself proved a willing adaptor to several changes that occurred within the period most notably around the group Opus Dei. They emerged in the 1950’s as group dedicated to the sanctification of the secular world (Payne, 1987, p.437). What lay at the heart of this was the belief that there was no better way to promote the spiritual values of the church than through the emerging new industries appearing in the 1950’s (Payne, 1987, p.438). As such, its members wielded large influence in certain areas of industry such as teaching, management, business and finance (Payne, 1987, p.438). Contrary to most of the other groups within Spain, Opus Dei were seen as progressive and modern and thus attracted the support of wealthy catholic progressives who wished to see a more open approach in business and industry (Payne, 1987, p.438). This in turn made them hated by members of the FET and other more traditional groupings in Spain who saw them as competition (Payne, 1987, p.438). The interesting point here is that Opus Dei represents both the traditional and the pragmatic nature of the Franco regime, and how it adapted over time. It retained a strong sense of traditionalism yet through groups such as Opus Dei was able to make clear it was not averse to modernisation in the 1950’s. This tension between tradition and modernity exposed the uneasy institutional relationships and central paradox at the heart of Francosim.
The second aspect of Francoism the chapter will analyse is that of the FET and its role during the regime. The FET was seen by many as the party of Franco yet as was noted in chapter two the relationship between them had never been smooth. Franco made good use of the FET and their ability to mobilise popular support during the war, it had succeeded in this task in so far as it had brought a solid political base for Franco’s regime (Payne, 1987, p325). The problem was of course that the FET was very broad, so that within it was a wide array of forces. It contained Falangists, Carlists, and Alfonsine Monarchists, and those who simply supported the nationalist cause. In this sense its search for a strong ideology in the post war period was difficult but while it maintained several elements there was one point of convergence; colonialism (Southworth, 1976, p.3). What this refers to is linked once again to this idea of traditionalism; in this sense several factions within the nationalist cause pined for a return to the golden age of the Spanish Empire (Southworth, 1976, p.4). There was wide spread support for the aims of the Axis powers during World War two which mainly came from the FET (Southworth, 1976, p.16). It wasn’t merely a case of siding with the Axis powers against the allies but a strong belief in the idea of empire that the two powers were aspiring to (Southworth, 1976, p.3). Spain had once been the world’s strongest power but had since the 17th century witnessed a long decline which had resulted in the loss of all its former possessions by 1898 (Southworth, 1976, p.4). This had a major effect on many of the Spanish people, who in the early years of the 20th century tried to adapt and accept this, while watching many of their neighbours maintain colonial empires; UK, France, Holland, Belgium and Portugal (Southworth, 1976, p.3) As such there had always been a long held belief among sections of Spanish society regarding a return to the heyday of empire. It was not just the fascist Falange but many monarchist supporters and nationalists believed strongly that the New Spain would be a colonial power once again. The idea of Spain becoming a colonial power at that time may seem ridiculous now yet it should not be understated. At the time the Franco regime was forging a New Spain very much in the image of the forces that had presided of Spain’s imperial golden age. With this, much was made, specifically among members of the FET, regarding the reconquest of several former colonies specifically in North Africa. Franco did speak to Hitler about helping in an attack on Gibraltar but to no avail (Southworth, 1976, p.18). It was in the early period of World War II that the imperial dream was at its height and several large demonstrations took place organised by the FET in support of Nazi Germany and fascist Italy (Southworth, 1976, p.16) Of course after World War II these ideas were abandoned, but they continued to inform certain sections of the regime’s support who felt it would, first, become internally powerful, then pursue its imperial ambitions (Southworth, 1976, p.20). The important point of note here is once again the link between Francoism and tradition. The victors in Spain of 1939 can be seen as people fighting back against republicanism, and secular modernity. Franco’s forces were opposed to these ideas and wanted to maintain the status quo. They were of course doing this for differing reasons but reaction against secularism, and the consolidation of Spain and her traditional institutions cannot be overlooked. The idea of empire was not touted by accident it was entirely in line with the ideology that the Franco regime was espousing in the immediate post war period. The crusade for ‘Catholic Spain’ for ‘Reconqista’ is an integral symbol of this and, as such, provides a basis of understanding what Francoism was.
It appears that Francoism was in many ways a reactionary ideology, one that sought to challenge secular ideas concerning the position of women, the nature of the family, and time honoured social hierarchies by bringing about a consolidation and return to traditionalism. This tradition had a strong Spanish character that was intrinsically linked to Catholicism and the role the church had played in the history of Spain. It was also linked to Spain’s imperial past, during which it had been the world’s leading power. Despite this, Francoism was not simply an ideology that knew what it opposed, within these traditional elements there was a strong sense of identity with specific morals and virtues again usually linked with traditional features of Spanish society. The irony of course here is that in pining for a return to certain traditional values, Francoism placed itself against any hope of returning to a powerful international position. It was suspicion of modernity that effectively stopped it from reasserting itself internationally; as such its stated ideology was highly contradictory. Francoism thus wanted power and glory within the confines of its own traditional vision of society. It evolved over time but in those early post war years its ideology was firmly one of mixed traditionalist authoritarianism. It was an ideology that could unite elements of fascism, conservatism and Catholicism within the confines of traditionalism based on perceived Spanish virtues and morals.
3.3 Economic Relations
In the aftermath of the civil war the Franco regime faced a country that had been very badly damaged by three years of internal conflict (Carr/Fusi, 1979/1983, p.49). In spite of this there was not widespread economic destruction; the main problems of the Spanish economy were in fact related to pre civil war issues regarding a failure to modernise. This was again down to failure to implement economic and agricultural reform (Carr/Fusi, 1979/1983, p.50). As such the impetus to forge a strong and viable Spanish economy was heavily required. The problem Spain was facing was that all around it a world war was waging and as such economic and trade relations were increasingly difficult to come by. Despite Franco’s refusal to join the Axis powers he was effectively isolated by the allies throughout the early years of his regime (Carr/Fusi, 1979/1983, p.52). In such circumstances Franco thus opted for a policy of self sufficiency which is often referred to as Autarky (Esteban, 1987, p.89). This embodied a self sufficient, self capitalising economy protected from outside competition by tariffs and administrative controls created and regulated by state intervention (Carr/Fusi, 1979/1983, p.50). This model was inherently interventionist in matters of the economy though it was not adverse to private ownership and individual initiative (Esteban, 1987, p.89). Indeed the regime itself was modelled around numerous members of the economic elites such as landowners and financiers (Carr/Fusi, 1979/1983, p.80). With the victory of nationalist forces these elites seized the opportunity to reinstate their hold over sectors of industry (Grugel/ Rees, 1997, p.25). The war had validated the idea of a strong state mainly as a tool for reshaping Spain but also as protection for the new regime (Grugel/Rees, 1997, p.23). It would seem that this economic model was opted for out of political reasons as much as economic. The regime needed to assert its authority over its populace while trying to cope with economic crisis and isolation. It thus made sense to opt for an economic model that seemingly dealt with both options. Bearing in mind that state intervention and protectionism had been used by several states during this period as a means of coping with economic crisis; Franco Spain was by no means adopting or forging a new system in this sense. It was merely coping with a period of crisis and trying to impose its will on its populace, by adopting protectionist economic policies which appeared to make sense in the circumstances.
The model adopted by Franco in the post war period was no doubt meant as a way of reasserting certain class divisions that had existed prior to the war; the war itself was a product of class conflict relating specifically to the agrarian question (Brenan, 1943/1983, Chpt’ 6). The regime was easily able to assert this control through its destruction of numerous organs of labour power; trade unions, political parties (Payne, 1987, p.220). These were banished in the post war period and as such owners moved back into their factories and, with assistance from the state were able to determine wages and salaries (Grugel/Rees, 1997, p.25). During the 1940’s there was widespread poverty and inequality among Spain’s working classes; this was largely the result the regime operating like a victorious invading army, and asserting its control by doing all in its power to weaken those who had opposed it. The traditional upper classes benefited hugely from this period mainly as a result of having a cowed workforce at hand while also being helped by state intervention. The upper classes effectively garnered all the positions of power through personal influence rather than economic prosperity. The effect this had was disastrous on Spain’s economy during the 1940’s as it became clearer that the model adopted was not suitable for long term economic growth and stability (Carr/Fusi, 1979/1983, p.51). By adopting the economic model it had, growth was effectively halted by restrictions on international trade in favour of prior commitment to the maintenance of order and social control (Poulantzas, 1976, p.10). Such measures had in the past only been adopted as temporary measures in other states aimed at coping with economic crisis, they were not intended as long term models and those states were not as isolated as Spain (Carr/Fusi, 1979/1983, p.51). Add to this the increasing refusal by sections of the upper classes to acknowledge any hint of reform that may impede their control and it was clear that the situation could not be sustained.
It was in the early 1950’s that the Franco regime realised it had to change its economic model for fear of widespread unrest. It was clear that it could not appease its fetish for tradition and pursue a line for economic stability and growth. The emergence of industrialisation brought about this change, the regime could not cling to any ideological virtues of traditional agrarianism and it was now clear that Spain’s industrial sector was far more economically profitable (Carr/Fusi, 1979/1983, p.80). This perceived change of power did little to damage the landowning elites as they merely switched their capital and interests; it was akin in many respects to the industrial revolutions that most of Europe experienced in previous centuries (Carr/Fusi, 1979/1983, p.81). That said the development of a productive mode of capitalism in Spain at such a late stage effectively opened it up to foreign capital which sought to invest heavily through connections with the elites who in turn operated much like speculators over its economy (Poulantzas, 1976, p.42). This change cannot be viewed simply within the Spanish context no matter how much the internal structure of the Franco regime hampered its growth, a large amount of the socio-political change that occurred during the latter stages of the regime was the result of the investment of foreign capital (Poulantzas, 1976, p.41). Investment from the United States and Europe during this period was marked by an attempt to transfer labour costs from their own countries to cheaper places abroad. This was done as a way of circumventing the high wages and powerful trade unions within the leading industrial states during the 60’s and 70’s (Poulantzas, 1976, p.12). The question of labour discipline was not in the early stages of the regime an issue for Spain as it imposed harsh measures on its workforce. In turn foreign investors got cheap and reliable labour while the regime benefitted from the capital invested and could open up trade to numerous other investors. As such the move towards industrialisation came about as productivity needed to be at as high a level as possible which it could only be with modern industrial technology and modern commercial arrangements. The move away from the earlier autarkic model was in turn as much about the global nature of capitalism as it was about any real innovation of the Franco regime. Of course Franco and Spain’s elites knew that they had to modernise for fear of unrest, but how this modernisation was to take place was very much decided by the specific context of economic relations at that time. In this case the increasing emergence of what was to be later called globalisation.
The contradiction with this was that by opening itself up to foreign capital it also opened itself up to the socio-political changes that come with such a change in policy. These mainly centre on the emergence and increasing of certain classes integral to such a change in structure (Poulantzas, 1976, p.41). The premise mainly rests on the emergence of a new fraction of the bourgeoisie, what Poulantzas called the ‘domestic bourgeoisie’ (Poulantzas, 1976, p.42). They are distinguished by their relation to foreign capital which is their sole interest as they are the intermediary for the implantation and reproduction of this capital (Poulantzas, 1976, p.43). The domestic bourgeoisie in this sense is denied much of the profit that comes from productive capital as most of it is goes to the foreign investors and elites (Poulantzas, 1976, p.43). This in turn provokes the contradiction to which the implementation of foreign capital in the guise of productive industry creates; it creates tensions among the emerging classes who in turn try to combat this sense of injustice. It also has a paradox for international capital which due to its investment brings about a situation that undermines its original aims which is to gain cheap productive labour through an authoritarian regime. In this sense the contradiction is twofold both for the regime and international capital as both their original aims are undermined by their relationship. During the Franco regime though any hint of a turn towards political consolidation was impossible given the structure of the regime and the fact that it rested upon a wilful commitment to deny those classes it deemed dangerous to its own hegemony. It was of course due to the modernisation of the economy under the dictatorship that the transition to a liberal democracy was possible. The regime itself was characterised by Franco’s personal rule, with his death, a peaceful transition was not only possible but was desirable to continue and deepen economic growth along with the improvement of living conditions for much of Spain’s populace.
The evolution of the Franco regime can be thus seen as one that effectively resulted in the emergence of a modern liberal democracy. Arriving at this point was by no means a deliberate attempt by the regime to open itself up, rather its response to economic and political crisis with the adoption of new policies that opened it up to the investment of foreign capital. This is in turn provided the Spanish state post Franco with the contradiction that had plagued its final years, given the benefits open to all parties involved it made perfect sense to move towards political consolidation as all sought to gain from such an agreement except a few regime loyalists. With this the lasting legacies of the Franco regime must be that it effectively succeeded in quelling any idea of a return to the idea of an Anarchist or Communist revolution and securing the primacy and security of capitalism which was what he and his forces had sought to defend. An irony to note is that one of the main ideological tenets of the regime, the Roman Catholic Church did not maintain its influence. This rests mainly on the basis that the Catholic Church has historically struggled to survive any thoroughgoing development of capitalism in any country, Spain was no different.

To what extent can the Franco Regime (1939 – 1975) be characterised a Fascist State Chapter Two – Fascism in Spain

2.1 Introduction

The intention of this chapter is to describe and analyse the evolution of fascism in Spain. This will begin by examining the origins and conditions that made fascism possible in Spain and will lead up to the civil war, where the role and impact of fascism will be noted including its influence on Francisco Franco. Having done this, I will conclude with a summary of the chapter’s findings and note their importance for the dissertation.

 

2.2 Origins – Primo Dictatorship 1923 – 1930

 

Primo de Rivera, not your average dictator

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Primo de Rivera dictatorship was a product of a specific era, one in which the liberal democracy of the period had been thoroughly discredited to the point that half of Europe was under some form of dictatorship (Romero, 1999, p.48). These dictatorships started as a counter-revolutionary defensive reaction which would attempt a revolution from above in order to neutralise that from below (Ben-Ami, 1983, p.69). The dictatorship of Primo’s was no different to this emerging trend across Europe. Although these dictatorships tended to be viewed at the time as fascistic in their approach, the chapter will show Primo’s rule was not that of a fascist dictator.
Much has been made of Primo’s relationship with Mussolini; indeed, he was a huge admirer of Il Duce and openly praised his dictatorship on numerous occasions (Payne, 1999, p.28). That said, open admiration for Italy’s new regime did not equate to a full-blown endorsement or offer a blueprint. Primo’s dictatorship was far more in line with those military dictatorships prevalent across Europe at the time specifically in the East (Romero, 1999, p.48). The 1920’s had witnessed the failure of several revolutionary attempts by left-wing forces mainly those of a Communist nature (Romero, 1999, p.48). The fear that these attempts at revolution had brought now resulted in embattled elites across Europe immersing themselves into a pattern of military dictatorships and Primo’s dictatorship was very much part of this trend (Romero, 1999, p.49). While it could be noted, that fascist regimes tend to assume power during crisis periods they are not alone in this respect. Indeed a majority of coup d’états take place during periods of political and economic crisis sometimes with a wilful opportunism and also on a popular basis like Primo’s.
The Primo dictatorship was a reaction to the failings of the previous liberal government in Spain and in many ways was a reaction to modernisation that was occurring across the country (Ben-Ami, 1983, p.70). The dictatorship was reasonably well received, with relief and broad, if shallow, support from the population even among some Liberals such as Ortega y Gasseti (Payne, 1999, p.25). The monarchy provided tacit support for the new dictator and did nothing to oppose the military uprising; King Alfonso XIII who had always distrusted the liberal government, certainly knew of the uprising and welcomed Primo with open arms (Romero, 1999, p.50). This attitude reflected that of the country as a whole, years of crisis both internally and externally had resulted in a strong resentment towards the previous government. The ongoing crisis in Morocco, the stagnant economic situation and the question of modernisation all helped bring Primo to power with little resistance. Primo assumed power with little in mind of how he would rule Spain, vague speeches gave some notion of an authoritarian and highly centralised state under the army’s control (Romero, 1999, p.51). Despite this, Primo’s dictatorship did try to remedy many of the country’s failings by investing heavily in public works schemes and education (Brenan, 1943/1978, p.82). Primo also pursued a successful relationship with certain sectors of the country’s labour force, the UGT union being the prime example (Brenan, 1943/1978, p.81). Brenan points out that this shows that Primo was quite humane and in many ways was an anachronism in the Spain of his time; his rule had more in common with Haroun al Rachid than that of Mussolini (Brenan, 1943/1978, p.80). Brenan’s point is an interesting one and it shows the pragmatism of the Primo dictatorship and that he recognised that Spain’s ills had to be remedied. His approach was one of trying to appease his enemies rather than destroy them. It brought the regime a good period of popularity and along with the victory in Morocco the Primo regime was on a high but it was soon to come crashing down. The pragmatism pursued by Primo could be described as also being extremely naive and one that is very short-term in its outlook (Carr, 1980, p.98). Good relations with labour will only last if labour is in demand and as the 1920’s ended, this along with several other problems became a major issue for the dictatorship. For all Primo’s appeasement of the lower classes he failed to remedy what was the single most important issue for a large portion of them, the agrarian question; Spain was still a country where powerful landowning elites presided over great swathes of the country’s land (Brenan, 1943, 1978, p.82). The question of redistribution was something Primo never attempted to answer given the contradictory nature of his rule. While trying to appease the lower classes, he could not afford to lose sight of where his support had come from in gaining power and maintaining it. Primo was thus continually trying to sway favour with competing interest groups in the country; while his regime remained a highly centralised elitist body it could never consolidate its position firmly among these competing groups. As long as it maintained support from the Army, the Church, and land owning elites, it could never firmly establish itself with any other sectors in society (Brenan, 1943/1978, p.84). By the late twenties, with the situation quickly spiralling out of control plots began to take shape against him, the liberals found their voice again while sections of the army and monarchy moved towards trying to consolidate their position by removing Primo (Brenan, 1943/1978, p.84). The dictatorship fell in 1930 and Primo died shortly after in Paris.
Primo’s rule was not that of fascism, while its origins are similar as a product of crisis, its characteristics and the nature of Primo’s rule were far more in line with a military dictatorship. The regime had failed to solve the country’s problems and had produced a Republic. The growth of left-wing forces in the aftermath of the dictatorship had also given rise to reaction from the right, the regime had not effectively mobilised the patriotic minded Spaniard but instead had contributed to the growth of more class minded and internationalist ideas. What many now realised was that a more authoritarian minded approach must be pursued; one that could succeed where Primo had failed and bring a new beginning to Spain. It was this mindset that led many on the Spanish right towards a fascist approach.

 

2.3 The Birth and Evolution of Fascism

 

Ramiro Ledesma Ramos, ‘the first Spaniard to define a relatively clear-cut Spanish fascism’.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

With the failure of Primo’s rule Spain once again became a Republic. After a short period of uncertainty during which the Monarchy of King Alfonso XIII tried to consolidate some power the Second Republic was eventually declared. It was during this period that fascist forces came to the forefront of Spanish politics. The main trends were that of intellectuals and political groupings, mainly parties who formed in this period (Payne, 1999, Chp1-2). These trends themselves represent a great deal of significance because they show, for the first time in Spanish history, individuals and groups that began to model themselves on fascism, and to adopt fascist ideals and tactics. The first significant group of this period was the National Syndicalist movement centred on Ramiro Ledesma Ramos, its founding intellect and leader (Payne, 1999, p.58). It was during this period that he became ‘the first Spaniard to define a relatively clear-cut Spanish fascism’ (Payne, 1999, p.55). The period of the early 1930’s witnessed the disarray of right-wing forces across the country having been badly defeated in the elections of 1931 (Romero, 1999, p.72). It was in this context that Ledesma founded the Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista (JONS) (Payne, 1999, p.63). The JONS espoused a mixed message that could be revolutionary and non-revolutionary, secular and staunchly Catholic and have differing opinions on issues such as anti-Semitism (Payne, 1999, p.62). These contradictory lines resulted from the group’s formation from a number of different nationalist groupings all with a specific variety of fascist style politics (Payne, 1999, p.63). It was no surprise that the group’s activity during its founding year of 1932 was limited, how best to organise and propagate such radical politics were to become subjects that frustrated Ledesma and the JONS leaders throughout this period (Payne, 1999, p.64). Ledesma realised that a more open approach with other sectors of the far right had to be adopted for fear of extinction. As such an open dialogue of cooperation was adopted with the newly formed Falange Espanola (FE) led by Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera, son of the former dictator (Payne, 1999, p.67).
Despite their later prominence the FE were similar to the JONS; a relatively small grouping which had very little influence outside right-wing circles and certain University campuses (Payne, 1999, p.68). They had formed in 1933 with Jose Antonio taking centre stage, at a speech in Madrid he declared ‘democracy was the most ruinous system of squandering energy and that the liberal state brought nothing but economic slavery’ (Ellwood, 1986, p.206). This open distaste and hostility for liberal democracy was to be the key feature of Jose Antonio’s and the FE’s politics along with the axiomatic hatred for Communism and Socialism. When the FE and JONS merged in 1934(FE de la JONS) they were still a small organisation and as such began pursuing a line for growth in certain sectors of Spanish society. The FE de la JONS suffered from ideological differences among its leadership (Thomas, 1968/1970, p.290). The main points of contention were shared between Ledesma and Jose Antonio who came from very different backgrounds and propagated a very different idea of what they saw as fascism or their specific brand of nationalist politics (Thomas, 1968/1970, p.290). Ledesma wanted an orientation to the masses with a Spanish style of national syndicalism, which was of a similar nature to certain trends within Italian fascism around Edmondo Rossoni,v and those within the Nazi Party around the SA (Blinkhorn, 1990, p.129). The FE were far more rooted in elitist circles and the upper and middle classes, it was a grouping mainly made up off Senoritos (Gentlemen) who had wealthy connections (Blinkhorn, 1990, p.130). Thus, the tension between Ledesma’s national syndicalism and the FE’s elitist and upper class support meant the party was hampered from the start. So it came to pass that despite relative success during 1934 Ledesma was eventually forced out of the party by Jose Antonio who assumed full power as Jefe (leader) of the party (Payne, 1999, p.135). This did little to benefit the party; losing Ledesma could open up the possibility of a more coherent ideology to be put forward, but the FE de la JON’s growth was minor during the pre war years (Ellwood, 1986, p.206). There are several reasons for this but the main one lies in the fact that it was severely hampered by its competition notably the strong traditional Catholic orientated parties and organisations of Spain such as the CEDA and the Carlists (Blinkhorn, 1990, p.130). All three would eventually become allies but, during this period, there was hostility between the groups mainly upon the outlook, powers, and role, of the Roman Catholic Church. The traditional groupings feared the fascism espoused by Jose Antonio and saw it as dangerous to the more conservative values of the Church. Going into 1936 the FE de la JONS and Spanish fascism were quite insignificant outside their few spheres of influence.

 

2.4 The Civil War

 

Jose Antonio, Jefe (Leader) of the Falange at the outbreak of the Civil War, he had campaigned vigorously for an uprising but would he be able to direct it?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

When the Generals unleashed their rebellion on the 18th July 1936, the violence and influence of the Falange had risen dramatically (Ellwood, 1986, p.210). Since the election of the Popular Front in February the Falange had become the fashionable group of the far right, mainly as a result of its promotion of violence and what many saw as its radical opposition to the incumbent government (Payne, 1999, p.194). This came about as a response to the government’s actions which included restricting the Falange in every way possible including the closing down of its Party centre and the jailing of its leaders including Jose Antonio (Payne, 1999, p.188). The effect this had was somewhat paradoxical; in one sense it severely hampered the organisation by cutting of many of its effective leaders and organisers by placing them in jail. On the other hand it provided the Falange with widespread sympathy and credibility among sectors of the Spanish populace who feared the Popular Front (Payne, 1999, p.189). So, from the relative obscurity of the far right, the Falange came to prominence in a short period of time, with many of its leaders in jail. Despite this the Falange was a far cry from being able to pursue an open line of rebellion in the hope of taking power. There were forces which it had to consolidate on the political right and, more importantly, within the armed forces. During 1935 and the first half of 1936 Jose Antonio was, no doubt, well aware that there were plans within the military to dispose of the government; with this in mind he approached the Generals. He sent one of his clerks to discuss the issue with General Mola who was unimpressed with Jose Antonio and the Falange (Payne, 1999, p.198/202). Mola was a relatively moderate Conservative and had little time for the fascist Falange; he sought a more structured relationship with the Carlists (Payne, 1999, p.202). In spite of this cold response, Jose Antonio, and the other leaders of the Falange, knew they had to back any plan prepared by the military. He then issued his directives for his party cadres concerning their conduct in the event of the uprising; these were very basic instructions regarding assistance to the military and trying to maintain Falange autonomy (Payne, 1999, p.203). The uprising came on the July 18th and wherever possible the Falange assisted the rebels in the military in attempting to overthrow the government (Ellwood, 1986, p.213). The uprising did certainly not go to plan as resistance against the conspiratorial Generals was massive in certain sections of the country. This had a major effect on the Falange as it effectively crippled its political leadership all of whom were, after a few days of fighting in government-held territory (Payne, 1999, p.207). While membership rose and men took up arms for the newly formed Junta de Defensa Nacional, the leaders of the Falange were in Republican prisons unable to provide any direct influence on its growing but inexperienced members (Ellwood, 1986, p.213). And so without its leaders the Falange became more and more co-opted into a larger Nationalist coalition whose leadership was maintained by the military. The death of Jose Antonio on 20th November 1936 effectively brought an end to any hope of the Falange maintaining its autonomous political character which Jose Antonio had so prized in the lead up to the war (Ellwood, 1986, p.214). The new leader of the Nationalist forces General Francisco Franco began to seek consolidation amongst the nationalist forces including the Falange.

 

2.5 Franco and the Falange

 

Francisco Franco was in many ways an unlikely leader of the nationalist forces; he had only shown tacit support for the rebellion up until the murder of Calvo Sotelo (Payne, 1999, p.239). Despite this he was to become military and later political leader of nationalist Spain. The way in which he acquired political dominance is interesting as it shows how Franco dealt with the Falange during the civil war. The political situation in Nationalist Spain was immensely confusing during the early stages of the war (Broue/Temime, 1972, p.414). This was, in part, due to two main facts; the expected rapid victory of the nationalist forces had not occurred and the largest political force in Nationalist Spain
was the army who were concentrating more on military matters (Broue/Temime, 1972, p.414/420). It was in this environment that the need for political consolidation amongst the nationalists came to the forefront. The onset of a longer war, no doubt, gave Franco cause to consolidate his power in the nationalist zone while also trying to undermine any attempts by the Falange and Carlists to take the political lead (Payne, 1999, p.244). Franco was in no doubt that a clear and coherent political base had to be developed as a way of winning mass support for the Nationalist cause (Payne, 1999, p.259). The best way to do this would be for a unified political structure rather than several competing groups operating in the same zone. Franco was first and foremost a military man and pragmatic when it came to politics as he had shown at the onset of the rebellion (Payne, 1999, p.239). Despite this he also understood the need for a clear political message and mobility as a way of avoiding the naive mistakes made by Primo de Rivera a decade earlier. For Franco then, it made perfect sense to unify those competing parties and groups within his zone, as a way of not only helping the war effort, but also of consolidating his own control and power.

The Falange was hampered by the circumstances of its leadership, as noted in the previous section. Despite these problems, the party elected a new temporary Jefe, Manuel Hedilla (Payne, 1999, p.249). Hedilla was an experienced and reliable member but he lacked the charisma and personal leadership qualities of Jose Antonio (Payne, 1999, p.250). His brief period of leadership would be marked by constant threats to his role and the development of cliques within the party all vying for control. The pressure on Hedilla became more hostile, the choice was simple, join forces with the Carlists and military at the risk of losing the Falange’s political identity, or strive to maintain autonomy and face civil conflict within the Nationalist zone. It seems both options presented the party with poor prospects; whichever Hedilla pursued the Falange were likely to lose. In April 1937, with events continually developing, the divisions within the Falange came to a head. Hedilla was ousted and replaced by a new triumvirate leadership (Payne, 1999, p.267). Despite Hedilla’s obvious weaknesses as a leader he was still able to launch a counter attack on the plotting forces and successfully regain power albeit with the help of the military (Payne, 1999, p.267). In the immediate aftermath, Hedilla called a meeting of the Falange National Council and was proclaimed Jefe Nacional permanently (Ellwood, 1986, p.217). Having watched the events closely, Franco and his advisors now felt the time was right to impose unification using the division within the Falange as an excuse to bring about unity through force (Broue/Temime, 1972, p.425). It was announced the same day as Hedilla was elected the new Jefe no doubt as a way of undermining the election and making clear who was in control of the Nationalist zone. Franco had by this point lost patience with both the Falange and Carlists and this division brought things to a head giving him a relatively easy excuse to consolidate his political power. Franco was smart enough, of course to offer leading members of both parties’ key positions within his new regime – with Hedilla being made the first member of the new Junta Politica (Payne, 1999, p.269). Hedilla was being put under pressure within the party not to accept Franco’s decision and to resist by defending the Falange’s political identity something that previous leaders, like Jose Antonio and Ledesma, had always prized (Payne, 1999, p.270). Consequently, Hedilla refused to accept his new position, and the unification imposed by Franco; he was duly arrested with several other prominent Falange leaders for inciting rebellion (Payne, 1999, p.270). There were sporadic bouts of resistance which would continue for a brief period, but on the whole the unification was successful (Broue/Temime, 1972, p.431).

Franco had achieved his goal of unifying both military and political power in the Nationalist zone while also ridding himself of some powerful rivals. The ease with how he did this was mainly down to the power that the military had in the nationalist zone and also the internal divisions of forces opposing him. With this step Franco had put in place the foundations of the system he was to preside over for another forty years (Ellwood, 1986, p.218). He, of course, did adopt numerous measures that were influenced by the Falange and adopted them in his new party’s name; Falange Espanola Tradicionalista (Payne, 1999, p. 269). How Franco dealt with the Spanish variant of fascism though was one that sought to both accommodate it but also curb its power and influence. A strong sense of pragmatism and cunning are clear here in Franco’s attitude as he worked towards bringing the Falange under his control while ridding it of elements he felt were either too radical or too dangerous to his own power. And so the great fear that had plagued both Jose Antonio and Ledesma came to fruition, the Falange was in power so to speak but at the cost of its own political identity.

2.6 Franco and the Axis Powers

It would be very problematic to concentrate on purely internal matters when dealing with the Spanish Civil War as this would miss a key characteristic of the conflict; foreign influence and intervention. Both sides of the conflict reached out in the early stages of the war for foreign assistance mainly on military grounds and had varying success (Beevor, 1982/2006, p.156). The importance of this for Franco was, of course, his appeals to Nazi Germany and fascist Italy for military assistance. It would be impossible not to cover these events for they may give some insight into the overriding question of Franco’s relationship with fascism, and its influence on him.
As noted, Franco only decided to join the military rebellion at a late stage. From July to October 1936 Franco was one of numerous military commanders though he was very influential. The setbacks of the rebellion due to fierce resistance had left large amounts of Franco’s troops stranded in Spanish Morocco; this was in part due to the failure of the naval rebellion which succeeded in large parts of the Navy siding with the Republic (Bolloten, 1991, p.97). It is important to note at this first juncture that no prior arrangements for military assistance had been made before the outbreak of the rebellion (Bolloten, 1991, p.97). Both Italy and Germany were aware of the rebellion but both were astute enough to know that it was by no means a foregone conclusion that it would succeed; indeed they were correct in this view. One can also not truly understand the reasons for this tactic without looking at the larger picture across Europe at that time where a widespread fear and distrust were evident in international relations (Bolloten, 1991, p.96). Blocs of influence were arising and the onset of appeasement, all countries while often harbouring hostility towards each other were keen to avoid unnecessary conflict and diplomatic crisis (Bolloten, 1991, p.97). Another important point to note is that while both did provide support it was for differing reasons and not at the same level (Preston, 1996, p.22). German assistance was on the whole quite limited, whereas by the end of the
war Italy was effectively making up a large part of the Nationalist forces (Preston, 1996, p.22). Therefore Italian and German assistance was by no means guaranteed as is often assumed. Hitler was committed to preventing as he put it ‘a Bolshevik State being set up in Spain’ but he also understood that Germany was in no place actively to commit itself militarily to a war effort (Bolloten, 1991, p.98). As such he waited till several days after the uprising had started and thought long and hard about the most practical solution to this conflict. Mussolini went through a similar process. Fortunately for Hitler and Mussolini it became clear that after this period that both France and the United Kingdom were suing for non-intervention (Bolloten, 1991, p.98). The reasons being they were both concerned about the dangers of escalation; certain sections of the UK government also showed little distaste for General Franco who they viewed as Chief of the Anti-Red Army (Moradiellas, 1996, p.6). All these events worked towards the favour of Franco and his forces as it soon became clear that support could be provided by Germany and Italy, without repercussions. Military aid began to arrive, mainly simple and necessary items at first, such as transport carriers, artillery, rifles, and, of course, tanks (Bolloten, 1991, p.93). However, as Preston notes ‘Italy was effectively at war with the Spanish Republic’ after this initial period of hesitancy, it fully committed itself to a Franco victory (Preston, 1996, p.49).
The question of the influence that Fascism had on Franco is difficult to evaluate given the complexities of his relationships, and the period. It is quite clear, however, that Franco was grateful for the assistance provided by Hitler and Mussolini though, he would have been aware that it had been given not on an impulse but as a careful political tactic. Both Hitler and Mussolini had acted in the interests of their own states; it benefited them to see a friendly dictator in charge of Spain rather than a Popular Front Government or worse a Socialist or Communist state. For Franco it was important to build solid relationships with states but as the Spanish Civil war ended, the Second World War began, and Hitler soon made clear his international ambitions. As such, normal relations between the countries are difficult to analyse, because the three states were during the period involved in conflicts. With Hitler’s ambitions laid bare, Franco had a decision to make regarding active alliances, and firmly rejected siding with Hitler and Mussolini, opting for neutrality. The reasons are numerous, ranging from the reality that Spain was recovering from a devastating Civil War, Spain still had by this point good relations with other countries and Franco obviously felt no inclination to support Hitler’s plans. I feel these are the key points for Franco’s refusal to support Hitler. It shows again that Franco was pragmatic, the issue was not for him ideological; it was a realist attitude to take, and one that in the long run, was to prove favourable to the survival of his regime. As such the influence Hitler and Mussolini had on Franco is varied; of course military assistance practically assured him of his victory in the Civil War, and he set up strong governmental ties with both countries during this period. That said Franco provided minimal support where he could to the countries during the Second World War (Preston 1996, p.51). The true effect of German and Italian influence will be seen in the next chapter when dealing with the Franco state. For the time being it must be noted that their influence was important in the victory of the Nationalist forces but it was not to the extent that Franco wished to join Hitler’s march across Europe. This shows, at least for now, that the influence of Nazism and fascism in Nationalist Spain was certainly not as great, or as unequivocal, as the rhetoric and posture of Franco’s regime might lead one to suppose.

 

Conclusion

 

Going into 1936 few would have been convinced of the importance of fascism in Spain. Yet after three years of civil war, Franco Spain was referred to as a fascist state. This chapter has sought to show fascism’s evolution in Spanish politics. In doing so, it has shown the context for how it came into being and its later growth. It has detailed and analysed its impact on Franco, and how he dealt with fascist parties like the Falange while also dealing with fascist powers such as Italy and Nazi Germany. The influence these had on him, would on this chapter’s findings, be minimal, but as the next chapter will show the purpose of this dissertation is to understand the nature of the Franco state and its qualification as fascist.

To what extent can the Franco Regime (1939 – 1975) be characterised a Fascist State Chapter One – Defining the Fascist State

1.1 Introduction

 

Benito Mussolini once wrote that the twentieth century was going to be the century of the state (Davies/Lynch, 2002, p.143). Mussolini’s point should be noted, fascism and the state are in many ways inseparable, the fascist project was in many ways defined by its use and understanding of what the state was and how it should be used. This dissertation is seeking to establish whether the Franco regime can be viewed as fascism, therefore a definition of the fascist state is pivotal. With this definition and an analysis of the Franco regime an answer can be given to the dissertation question. In this chapter three separate definitions will be considered and examined along with their perspective ideas and theory. Having done this it will move onto towards an overall conclusion, which will consider the relative merits of each theory while providing individual input.

 
1.2 Totalitarianism

 

Hannah Arendt was one of many influential theorists who adopted the Totalitarian model

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The first theory of the fascist state I will deal with is that of Totalitarianism. This is a common description of fascist states specifically Nazi Germany though many authors attribute it to fascist Italy. What is meant by the term is somewhat contentious though a clear line of ideas that tend to intertwine were published during the post World War Two period. The theorists of this period mark as a starting point for a definition that of a Totalitarian minimum often referred to as the six-point syndrome (Friedrich/Brzezinski, 1965, p21). The syndrome consists of a certain criteria that totalitarian regimes must meet in order to be categorised as such (Friedrich/Brzezinski, 1965, p21). As Friedrich and Brzezinski contend ‘these basic features are what we think constitute the distinctive pattern or model of totalitarian dictatorship’ (Friedrich/Brzezinski, 1965, p21). The traits are as follows; ideology, a single mass party, a system of terror, a technologically conditioned monopoly of control, a similar technologically conditioned monopoly on effective use of weaponry and central control of the entire economy (Friedrich/Brzezinski, 1965, p23). It must be noted that the authors are clear that the features are not eternally binding and that other additions may feature in some regimes and others may play more important roles in others (Friedrich/Brzezinski, 1965, p24). In essence these elements provide a minimum notion that many academics and authors use to define any specific theory, a certain array of ideas and features that constitute the backbone of any proposed theory.
Of course Friedrich and Brzezinski are not the only authors to write about the concept but theirs remains highly influential. Every subsequent writer on the topic has had to confront their work in some respect (Kershaw, 1985/1993, p.21). Leonard Schapiro considered it valuable but that it confused two entirely different things, that of characteristic features or contours and the instruments of rule (Schapiro, 1972, p.20). For Schapiro a line should be drawn between the two; a party is merely an instrument of rule where a leader is a charismatic feature of the regime (Schapiro, 1972, p.20). Schapiro separates his theory into a two featured approach with contours on one side and instruments of rule on the other. The contours are; the leader, the subjugation of the legal order, controls over private morality and mobilisation and mass legitimacy (Schapiro, 1972, p.5). The instruments of rule are; ideology, the party and the church, state and society (Schapiro, 1972, p.5). In comparison, both proposals are concerned with defining the theory in an ideological manner, in which points and traits feature heavily. Schapiro does not disagree with the premise of the six point syndrome, only with its structure. In essence the two theories are very similar though they both come to different conclusions. Friedrich and Brzezinski contend that totalitarian dictatorship is in a sense, the adaptation of autocracy to twentieth century industrial society (Friedrich/Brzezinski, 1965, p21). Schapiro is far more descriptive noting his double sided approach describing both contours and pillars in the conclusion he gives (Schapiro, 1972, p.119).
The state in this sense would appear to be something which maintained control over every aspect of a population and their existence. Indeed the term derives from this notion of totality. Despite this Schapiro rejects the notion of the totalitarian state seeing it as a contradiction as all forms of rule associated with the state must be overcome for any ruler to maintain power (Schapiro, 1972, p.71). So the state and society must in essence become subject to the wishes and will of those who have taken power therefore subjugating the state’s power to an individual leader and in many cases, a party apparatus. The state ceases to operate as before and becomes an instrument of dictatorship. Arendt understood this as the state not being destroyed but almost left in the shadows as official roles are duplicated and maintained by the ever-increasing power of the party (Arendt, 1951/1973, p.396). It is this emphasis on party or more importantly organisation that is pivotal for this rejection of the existence of a totalitarian state, as Arendt notes ‘power as conceived by totalitarianism, lies exclusively in the force produced through organisation’ (Arendt, 1951/1973, p.418). The organs that dominate totalitarian regimes then are not those that are conceivably linked to the state but those that have the organisational capability to replace it. State power is thus subsumed into a myriad of party organisations that essentially devour the former organs in some cases duplicating them and in others completely replacing them. This would seem pointless; why would one not just take power, use the state apparatus and operate within its framework? This of course ignores the stark realities and ideological implications that most totalitarian movements aspire to, it is not merely the pursuit of power but the wielding of this power must be one that rejects all other forms of power as illegitimate.

 
1.3 Totalitarian critics and alternatives

 

The totalitarian conception is of course not the only understanding of a fascist state, it is one of many. The next two ideas to be examined are in many ways a critique of the totality ideal and in approaching them the dissertation shall analyse the criticism while focusing on the proposed definitions they see as an alternative understanding. Criticisms of totalitarianism fall into two main categories; those who reject, outright, the concept and theory, and those who concede some theoretical validity to the concept, but regard it as limited in its scope (Kershaw, 1985/1993, p.31). The dissertation will deal with both models individually starting with the rejection model first.

 
1.3-1 Marxist Critique

 

The idea behind totalitarianism, is that it is a product of Cold War mentality and an attempt to discredit the Soviet Union by contending it was little different to Nazi Germany or fascist Italy (Kitchen, 1976/1994, p.25). This does not generally deal with why it is a discredited concept but focuses on the reason that it may have been constructed for dubious purposes. So what are the more fundamental reasons for this rejection? One point relates to the notion of ideology being a pivotal make up of a totalitarian regime, as already noted these regimes have an all-commanding ideology. Now when dealing with the development of fascism it becomes clear that this was fraught with inconsistencies (Kitchen, 1976/1994, p.28). Fascist movements relied heavily upon a wilful commitment to capitalise on social antagonisms and exploit them for their gain, whether it is nationalism, class division or ethnicity (Kitchen, 1976/1994, p.28). The ideas and doctrines that brought both Hitler and Mussolini to power were varied when they were put into practice, Mussolini ironically once saying ‘our doctrine is action’ (Kitchen, 1976/1994, p.28). Of course there were ideas that were put into action such as the Nazi’s persecution of the Jews yet this was not the only idea within Nazism. There were consistent themes (Nationalism in Italy, Anti-Semitism in Germany) but these tended to coincide with several other themes that would make it problematic to view fascism as being an all-commanding ideology as in some cases they are very contradictory. Mussolini had no problem advocating women’s rights in his first program but this was not in line with the blood and soil male culture of fascism, not to mention once in power he presided over a completely male dominated state (Paxton, 1998, p.19). Ideology plays a pivotal role in all the proponents of totalitarianism yet it would seem to be hard to come to any conclusion regarding there being a coherent theory of fascism. It could be argued that fascism seeks to only enforce certain aspects of its ideology once in power and in doing so makes concessions along the way as a sort of Realpolitk. This does still not seemingly fit within the totalitarian framework as it proposes that ideology is merely a tool for gaining power not a coherent set of ideas that criticise the existent society and propagate a new one. The emphasis on ideology by the proponents of totalitarianism thus misses the changes that occur within fascist regimes and that there was never one pure idea that defined fascism merely a set of inter- related proposals that in turn evolved over time and in many cases where crude propaganda.

Nicos Poulantzas proposed a highly influential Marxist concept of the Fascist State that critiqued the Totality model

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The next point to analyse is the question of economic structure under totalitarian regimes. According to the proponents of totalitarianism every institution belongs to the state and all forms of social life come under the state or the regimes control (Poulantzas 1970/1974, p.314). They insist that these regimes are counter posed to the capitalist and free market states of the West as they do not allow for the autonomy of the economy (Poulantzas, 1970/1974, p.314). This issue of autonomy is important for many critics of the totality theory as many contend that this was a mere illusion given the existence of private institutions within Nazi Germany and fascist Italy (Kitchen, 1976/1994, p.31). While the fascist parties talked of the third way, in reality they did little to change the status quo regarding private ownership of industry and capital (Kitchen, 1976/1994, p.31). The same workplace structure was maintained with party leaders replacing managers and a more rigid idea of workplace discipline implemented but there was no radical transformation of workplace and economic structure (Kitchen, 1976/1994, p.27). Poulantzas goes even further by contending that fascist states are a particular form of capitalist state, one that corresponds to a period of crisis in the capitalist system (Poulantzas, 1970/1974, p.313). It has the specific features of a capitalist state namely the separation of economic power from political power and maintains the presiding class structures that are inherent in all capitalist states (Poulantzas, 1970/1974, p.313). The issue for both Poulantzas and Kitchen is that there was no radical transformation of society under fascism, it did not change societal relations nor did the states themselves transform, it merely degenerated into a particular form of capitalism. Many would note the highly interventionist style of economic management of Mussolini but this could be easily counter posed to many states of the period who adopted extreme interventionist measures as a matter of economic necessity. Even the idea of Corporatism which was widely championed as the fascist economic policy is difficult to substantiate. For Blinkhorn, Corporatism was a matter of pragmatism for Mussolini who saw it as a way of championing originality abroad with a vision of a new Italy (Blinkhorn, 1984/1994, p.32). In reality it was never something that corresponded to a new economic structure, the idea was well championed in Italy but it was never something Mussolini could pursue given its syndicalist character and in the aftermath of the crisis of 1929, he was not going to pursue any policy that may increase the power of labour (Blinkhorn, 1984/1994, p.31).

Totalitarianism is fraught with inconsistencies two of which have been highlighted in this section. Out of these critiques a second understanding of the fascist state; it is a specific form of capitalist state or as Poulantzas labels it ‘Exceptional State’ (Poulantzas, 1970/1974, p.313). The exceptional here denotes that it is a response to a capitalist crisis and in doing so; it is designed not to destroy the capitalist state but to save it. This holds that the capitalists themselves are complicit in bringing about fascism as a last resort for fear of a socialist or communist revolution. The capitalists continue to operate much as they did before but with occasional issues with the fascists themselves, in many cases though this (as noted above) was minimal in Italy where party members replaced managers in industry and so forth (Kitchen, 1976/1994, p.27). The Marxist alternative then is that a fascist state is an extension of a capitalist state, one that in a period of crisis responds by helping reactionary forces of that period come to power so as to avoid a working class revolution which in turn would cripple or destroy the nature of the capitalist system.

 

1.3-2 Functionalist Critique

 

The functionalist critics differ from the Marxists and other critics who reject outright the idea and theory of totalitarianism. They instead acknowledge it, but believe it to be far too rigid in trying to explain the numerous peculiarities of fascist regimes. Kershaw sees Friedrich’s model as being too static and not allowing any room for change and development within the system itself (Kershaw,1985/1993, p.21). At the core of Friedrich’s theory is an exaggerated notion of the monolithic nature of totalitarian regimes which is divorced from reality (Kershaw, 1985/1993, p.21). In essence Friedrich’s theory is one that tries to explain the complexity of a system such as Nazi Germany with rigid ideas and prescribed theoretical notions. It fails to allow for any fluidity or change that could occur within that system, hence Kershaw’s description of it as static. This critique is of particular importance to functionalist critics who maintain that Nazi Germany was not in its twelve year existence consistently the same. What presented itself as the new government of National Socialist Germany in 1933 was very different from war time Nazi Germany (Broszat, 1981/1993, p.xi). The new government in 1933 was a coalition of sorts with the old conservative forces in state and society and during those early years there was a constant conflict of interests fought out between the state and the party (Broszat, 1981/1993, p.xi). This leads Broszat to describe the National Socialist regime from 1933 – 1936/37 as a semi authoritarian, semi fascist form of government which tended both to strengthen the state while also strengthening the authoritarian dictatorship (Broszat, 1981/1993, p.xi). Broszat’s points are interesting as they also complement the Marxist critique regarding fascism being a last resort of the capitalist and ruling classes to maintain power and influence. The goal of the conservative, authoritarian elements of the administration, armed forces and business was to contain Hitler while preserving the state and their power within it (Broszat, 1981/1993, p.xiv). Where the two critiques differ is that the functionalists note that when Hitler began his policy of expansionism he defied the limited aims of the elites within society which were generally aimed towards traditional nationalist aims (Broszat, 1981/1993, p.xiv). It was this change in policy that resulted in the loss of influence of the more moderate elements of the state and any hope of restraining Hitler’s extreme policies were lost (Broszat, 1981/1993, p.353). After this initial period the Nazi’s became to all intents and purposes totalitarian in their approach and outlook. They worked towards the complete control of all aspects of society in the name of a greater good, in this case winning the war. Despite this, the actual functioning of Nazi Germany was far from controlled, indeed in many ways it was extremely chaotic with numerous factions within the party and apparatuses vying for influence (Kershaw, 1985/1993, p.23). The functionalists therefore see major inconsistencies regarding totalitarian theory regarding its refusal to acknowledge the inner dynamics and evolution of fascist states.
To take the six point syndrome of Friedrich and to apply it to both Nazi Germany and fascist Italy you would undeniably see similarities but they would be on the whole generalisations. They are insufficient to explain the structure and workings of the fascist system as proposed by the functionalists who rightly maintain that such a description does not take note of the inconsistent changes of the regimes over time. Most notable is Broszat’s point regarding how in the early phases of the National Socialist regime it was in many ways a dual power relationship between the Nazi’s and existing conservative forces who wished to maintain influence. This stark reality makes a mockery of the notion of total control over all aspects of people’s lives while also damaging the notion of ideological supremacy and the role of the mass party. It reinforces certain Marxist ideas that there is a relationship between capitalism and fascism which is so strongly denied by totalitarian theorists who maintain that fascism defined in their terms is an attack on the ideals of liberal democracy and capitalism.

 
1.4 The Fascist State

 

The complexities and contradictions that fascist states espoused are very difficult to comprehend. That said it is not impossible to come to some understanding of what a fascist state is, the chapter has analysed three theories that are quite different in approach and understanding, yet have given the dissertation its definition of the fascist state, which it will use to compare to Franco Spain. The fascist state is a state that is created in a specific period of economic and political crisis in the prevailing system, in this case capitalism. Both the Marxists and functionalists observed this point and saw it as lacking from the totalitarian perspective which put too much emphasis on generic concepts such as ideology. Ideology is important for fascists but it is in no way strictly homogeneous but one that is varied with some consistent themes and others that evolved over time. Both fascist Italy and Nazi Germany went through this process of evolution; the Nazi’s even consolidated their regime by a coalition with authoritarian elements of the conservative establishment; Mussolini never fully rid himself of the Catholic Church despite the fascist party’s strenuous attempts to limit clerical authority. These points seemingly contradict the notion of a strict ideology that totalitarianism places so much weight on but it is wrong to dismiss ideology entirely; it is of great importance to fascist states but it contains varied elements that do not always seemingly coexist in harmony. This is in part due to fascist forces being of a varied makeup because of its willingness to capitalise on various social antagonisms for political gain.
The second point was regarding the fascist state’s economy, which is seen as being completely controlled by the party and its sister organs. This completely misses the existence of numerous independent private institutions of industry and capital that existed in both regimes. The Marxist point on this is important, and it is the one that underpins the analysis of this dissertation, namely that the dominant relations in capitalist society are not abolished, but are, on the contrary enhanced in many ways to favour the fascist party and the capitalists. The party became the managerial class of fascist states but in no way did it attempt to transform economic and class relations. The worker still worked, the manager still managed and the capitalist still profited. Totalitarianism insists on the complete control of all economic relations yet it is plain to see that while the party did seek to impose itself upon economics and industry it did so in a way that did not interfere too much with the existing relations of production. A second criticism of the total control point is that made by the functionalists who dispute the term as inadequate to explain the sheer chaotic nature of fascist states specifically Nazi Germany. The number of organisations that arose during Nazi rule is astounding, and with the proliferation of agencies and institutions the idea of party control and autocratic, or dictatorial rule, was attenuated, as it appears that numerous decisions were made without many leading Nazi’s knowledge. This point can relate to economics and the actual social structure that are alleged to be under total control by the party and its leader. Nazi Germany was a
state that while striving for economic discipline was chaotic and unpredictable with a constant surge for power and influence amongst its party members.
A fascist state is a state born out of a political and economic crisis during which populist and reactionary forces come to power. It is this process which distinguishes fascism from other regimes that gain power in crisis times. This process itself predetermines how a fascist state operates in relation to ideology and economics. It has an ideology but one that is by no means static and is constantly evolving and suiting itself to particular situations for political gain. Economically it is an extension of a capitalist state with noted differences, it is highly interventionist but a large proportion of private capital remains along with the prevailing class structure of capitalist society. While striving for discipline it is chaotic in its economic and societal structure this owing to the mass bureaucracies it creates around the party and its organs.